What an old wreck can tell us
It’s
a sparkling June morning in the Lakes Region of New Hampshire. At a parking
area halfway up Belknap Mountain in Gilford, a small group of hikers assembles
amid the squawking of blue jays and oven birds. The group, nearly all of us
strangers, adjusts our gear as we await our guide for the morning, Stephen
Brown, a safety specialist with the Federal Aviation Administration.
It’s
about an hour hike to the summit, which overlooks scenic Lake Winnipesauke and
the surrounding White Mountains. But it’s not the view that we’re here to see.
Forty-six years ago, on June 18, 1972, two young men flying in a Piper Arrow
took off from Laconia Municipal Airport, turned southbound toward Massachusetts
and slammed into the side of the mountain, killing both. The plan is to hike to
the wreckage, learn the details of the crash and contemplate the implications
of that tragic day.
Brown
is a fit, fortyish man with a brush-cut haircut and a broad smile. He advises
us to apply plenty of bug spray lest the mosquitoes and black flies make a meal
out of us.
Leading
the way, Brown keeps up a steady patter as he points out things and warns us to
avoid tripping over exposed tree roots or slippery rocks. He works out of an
office near Boston, but is a long-time resident of Laconia, and says he’s hiked
these woods many times. He says he’s long known of the accident and even
visited the crash site, but until recently always had the story wrong. For some
reason, he always thought it involved a husband and wife departing after a weekend
visit in the fall; that they took off into the clouds and either failed to
follow the correct departure procedure or encountered icing in clouds and flew
into the mountainside.
One
day, while waiting to get his car repaired in town, Brown ducked into the local
library and began doing some research. Reading old newspapers, he learned that
the flight actually involved two young men, that it occurred in early summer,
and that the flight was conducted under visual flight rules. Not only that, but
the wreckage wouldn’t be found for nearly a year. Almost as intriguing, Brown
said, was realizing how different flying was back then—long before GPS came
into use, at a time when radar coverage and air traffic control assistance was
less available, when weather forecasting was not nearly as accurate or
long-ranging as today, and before aircraft were required to carry emergency locator
beacons.
The more he learned, the more Brown
became convinced that the story of the accident and the hike to the crash site
would make for a unique safety seminar.
A
fire tower marks the mountain’s 2,382-foot summit. Brown tells us to take a
break while we wait for a handful of stragglers to catch up. For those not
afraid of heights, he encourages climbing the tower’s narrow stairs in order to
take in the view.
The
flight that June ’72 day began 120 miles to the southwest, in Great Barrington,
Massachusetts. Richard Ruthel, 26, was a flight instructor who aspired to be
airline pilot like his father. He had more than 2300 hours of experience, a
number that by today’s standards would easily qualify him for work at a major
airline, but because of a surplus of ex-military pilots for hire at the time,
jobs at airlines were few and far between (Ruthel would be 72 and retired
today).
His
student that day was Carl Juhaze, 20, of nearby Copake, NY. Juhaze had about 20
hours of experience, but was considered an “atypical” student. He wasn’t
receiving formal training and didn’t seem to care about getting his license. He
just liked to fly and would occasionally show up at the airport on weekends to
rent a plane and go up with an instructor.
The
plane was a year-old, four-place Piper Arrow, N5291T.
The
weather forecast was for cloudy skies, with the overcast lowering throughout
the day. Hurricane Agnes was churning up the Eastern Seaboard, and showers were
forecast for overnight, with heavy rain and winds the next day.
The
plan was to fly to Laconia and back—about an hour each way. Witnesses in Laconia reported the two did not stick around long, just enough for a bathroom
break and gulp of water. The two may have felt pressure to hurry because the
plane was blocked out for just two and one-half hours. But another factor may
have been the weather. Laconia was reporting a 1,500 foot broken ceiling,
visibility five miles in haze, and winds out of the southeast at 6 knots.
Belknap
Mountain stands just three miles to the south of Laconia airport. Because of
this, the procedure for eastbound departures out of Laconia is to climb to
2,500 feet before making any turns. After takeoff, 91T made an immediate turn
to the south.
“I
want you to keep in mind that this was a place of tragedy,” Brown says to the
assembled group before leading us down to the crash site. “Two young men died here. They left behind
grieving parents, siblings and friends.” In addition, there’s the impact on the
dozens of people who searched for the wreckage and the people who ultimately
recovered the bodies, the impact on the flight school that rented the plane and
the community of pilots at the airport, and the impact on the investigators
themselves. It’s hard not to be affected, Brown says, and every investigator
can cite a particular case that still tears at them.
The
last 125 yards off trail to the crash site is a steep scramble over rocks and
dense underbrush. It’s single file. If you don’t know exactly where to look the
wreckage would be easy to miss.
“There’s
not all that much left,” admits Brown, standing in front of crumpled mass of
aluminum that was once a wing. Nearby is the engine block and a section of what
was the horizontal stabilizer. When the plane was discovered, Brown says, the
tail section was wrapped around a tree. Most of the fuselage was destroyed in
the fire, and the only recognizable part of the cockpit left is the rudder
pedals. Over time, Brown says, the wreckage has slid several yards down the
side of the mountain from it’s original impact point.
If,
as Brown suspects, the plane was in the clouds when it hit the mountain, the
end would have been mercifully swift. “They barely had time to suck in a final
breath when they realized what was about to happen to them,” he says.
Investigations
are multifaceted, Brown says. It
begins with the wreckage. In this case, they would have looked at damage to the
trees and other impact marks to determine direction and speed. They’d examine
the propeller and engine to see if the engine was developing power, and if so
how much. They’d look for “slap” marks on cockpit instruments, created when the
needles on cockpit instruments slap against the dial on impact, showing exactly
what they indicated at the time of the crash.
But
there’s also a lot of background research. They interview witnesses, look at
the plane’s maintenance records, examine the training and background of the
pilots, their medical history, their life situation and possible extenuating
circumstances. It’s one reason why full accident reports take a year or more to
complete.
In
this case, the investigation was even more difficult because the wreckage wasn’t
found for nearly a year.
Once
people realized the plane was missing, officials struggled to determine where
to begin looking. There was no distress call, no flight plan, nothing beyond
the basic route of flight between Great Barrington and Laconia, a route that
covered a lot of forest land and hilly terrain. Search efforts concentrated on
the region around Mount Monadnock near Keene, NH, the largest mountain along
the route of flight.
On
June 25, searchers believed they found something near Campton, NH, near Lake
Winnipesauke. It turned out to be a Cessna 182 piloted by Melvin Seymour that
went missing six years before. Seymour was flying to Portland, Maine, from
Preston, Iowa, when he disappeared on March 19, 1966.
In
the absence of a resolution, rumors began to circulate. Juhaze, it was learned,
had spent time in a mental hospital and had been involved in the theft of an
aircraft in New York. Speculation started that perhaps he hijacked the plane,
that maybe he forced Ruthel to fly him to Canada. Maybe it was some sort of
murder-suicide, or maybe they did it together.
With
no evidence of a crash and no clue where else to look, the search was
officially called off on June 29, 1972. News coverage of the missing plane and
the mystery surrounding it quickly disappeared, eclipsed by the July 4 holiday,
the 1972 presidential campaign and the growing Watergate scandal in Washington.
Nearly
a year later, two young Laconia men, Alan Dauphin and Lloyd Decato, noticed
something glinting in the sun off the side of Mount Belknap. Curious, they
decided to investigate. Not far from the summit, they saw the tail of the plane
stuck in a tree, flapping in the wind. While one of the young men stood by the
wreckage, the other climbed to the forest tower on the summit for help.
The
week before Decato’s younger brother had made the same climb. And though he
never reached the wreckage, his dog returned with an odd-looking bone. Their
father told them it was the bone of an animal. Authorities determined it was
the knee bone of one of the victims.
In
its final report, the National Transportation Safety Board determined that
Ruthel had climbed into the clouds, leveled off and then flew straight into the
mountain. It concluded that he probably misjudged his altitude. How did this
happen? The NTSB doesn’t say. A look at the plane’s altimeter should have told
Ruthel exactly how high they were.
My
own theory: With Hurricane Agnes approaching the barometer was likely rapidly
falling. Aircraft altimeters have to be adjusted to the barometric pressure in
order to read correctly, and an altimeter uncorrected to a falling barometer
will read higher than the actual altitude. Having planned for a strictly visual
flight that day, it’s possible the two men failed to reset their altimeter
before leaving Great Barrington, and then again before departing Laconia. After
taking off and turning to the south, a decision was made to climb into the
clouds.
That,
however, is my own speculation. Airplane crashes—even the most obvious ones—are
always a bit of a mystery. How does someone with all that training and
experience make such a stupendous blunder? It’s difficult to understand. Investigators, with all their
collective experience and expertise, can never get inside the head of a pilot.
Was it stress? Hubris? Complacency? Maybe a bit of all three. Such is the
nature of human psychology.
Having
flown long enough and read enough accident reports, however, I know that no
pilot is immune from making bad decisions. Scott Crossfield, a legendary test
pilot, the first man to fly twice the speed of sound and who helped design and
fly the X-15 rocket plane, took off in his Cessna 210 from an airfield in
Prattville, Alabama, in 2006 and flew straight into a line of thunderstorms,
never to be seen again. Any pilot reading
this who says “That could never happen to me” is either a fool or a liar.


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